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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the properties of a system of internationally traded "licenses to
pollute" for the control of acid rain in in the Eastern United States and Canada. I report estimates of
the costs to the United States and Canada of achieving a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentrat-
ions under a joint tradeable permit system for sulfur dioxide emissions. I use point-source data for
the 200 largest sulfur dioxide emitters in each of Canada and the United States, transfer coefficients
that relate emissions in different regions to acid rain concentrations in specified "sensitive receptor"
regions, and fitted cost functions for each point source, to estimate the costs facing each country under
different acid rain abatement programs. The estimates show (1) that an autarkic program of abatement
in either country induces significant spillover benefits in the other that lead to the potential for "free-
riding", and (2) that, contrary to widespread beliefs, a joint program of abatement would lead to
substantial cost savings for both the United States and Canada. The results also document, however,
large differentials in the gains that would accrue to each country, suggesting that there may be serious
obstacles, in the form of difficulties in arriving at a division of the gains from trade, to achieving
agreement on a joint program of abatement.
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1. Introduction
As theory has filtered into the realm of policy, the past 20 years have witnessed increasing sophis-
tication in dealing with environmental externalities, as reflected in the system of tradeable licenses for
sulphurous oxide emissions ("emissions licenses") among electric utilities, authorized by the 1990 amend-
ments to the U.S. Clean Air Act. Even so, market-based programs that have been implemented to date
remain well behind the state of the art. A system of tradeable emissions licenses, in its conception, is
at least two steps removed from addressing the matter of ultimate economic interest: achieving an optim-
ized level of ambient pollution. One key missing feature is that even cost-minimized reductions in emis-
sions do not translate directly into the attainment of objectives specified in terms of levels of ambient
pollution (that is, in terms of environmental quality). Likewise missing is any effort to equate marginal
damage from ambient pollution with the (minimized) cost of abating the emissions that give rise to that
pollution.
We may yet be some way from having the information needed to implement programs to achieve
optimized levels of ambient pollution. But, though virtually unutilized to date, we do possess the
techniques and are beginning to develop the data to address the problem of optimizing the cost of achiev-
ing exogenoualy specified environmental objectives expressed in terms of levels of ambient pollution.
Doing so would he an important advance. It is rarely the case, especially with airborne contaminants,
that emissions reductions translate in a straightforward manner into improvements in ambient environ-
mental quality. Emissions, even from a single source, can have spatially differentiated effects. When
emissions from multiple sources affect environmental quality differentially in different regions, the
problem of efficiently achieving specified improvements in ambient air quality will depend in a complex
way both on the cost structures of abatement at the different sources of emissions and also on the ways
in which emissions from those sources disperse. That second dimension may render efficient attainment
of environmental quality objectives very different from efficient abatement of emissions.
In theory, we know that a system of marketable "licenses to pollute" can be used to decentralize
the problem of minimizing the cost of attaining ambient environmental objectives in spatially distinct
regions. The existence and efficiency of the solution was first established by Montgomery (1972). Its
implementation, however, is more informationally demanding than a simple system of tradeable emissions
licenses. It requires, in particular, estimates of the mappings from each source of pollutants to ambient
environmental quality in each target region of interest. To study this possibility realistically requires, in
addition, data about actual sources of pollutants in the emitting regions under study. Such data are only
now starting to become available on any large-scale basis. Since they are, however, the time seems ripe
to begin exploring seriously the optimized pursuit of environmental objectives, rather than merely control-
ling the release of environmental contaminants.
This paper reports an investigation of precisely that sort. I exploit a recent, comprehensive in-
ventory of North American sources of acid rain precursors, developed under the auspices of the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to study the implementation of a program of acid rain control
in the Northeastern United States and Eastern Canada through a system of marketable licenses to pollute.
My objective in pursuing this investigation is not merely confined to studying the gains to be achieved
with a system of this sort.' There are collateral, but nevertheless important advantages to such systems,
advantages that have been almost entirely overlooked by reason of the fact that their actual implementa-
tion has so infrequently been explored.2 Spatially differentiated regions of concern may fall under differ-
' It should be reasonably apparent that, for a given set of ambient environmental objectives,
minimizing the cost of achieving those objectives, rather than minimizing the cost of reducing emissions,
is the appropriate way to proceed. It provides an additional margin to work with, stemming from the fact
that, even with costs of abatement held constant, abating emissions from some sources will more
efficiently reduce ambient pollution than will emissions abatements from others.
2 Atkinson (1983) and Atkinson & Tietenberg (1982), are two small scale exceptions.
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ent legal jurisdictions, a fact that may be of particular importance when the jurisdictional boundaries hap-
pen to be national. Since airborne pollutants are not in the habit of respecting national boundaries, dom-
estic efforts to achieve given ambient environmental quality objectives through the control of domestic
emissions may sometimes not even be feasible. Even when they are, autarkic programs of environmental
management are quite likely to be inefficient when compared to coordinated, multi-jurisdictional efforts.
Nevertheless, it has often proved difficult to arrive at international agreements for the control of trans-
boundary pollution. It might prove more feasible to coordinate multi-jurisdictional environmental man-
agement through the formation of international markets in permits.
In this paper I explore both of these issues in the context of the acid rain problem in the North-
eastern United States and Eastern Canada. At a technical level this particular problem is characterized
by complex relationships between emissions of acid-rain precursors and resulting ambient pollution, in-
volving bilateral international flows of the pollutants of interest. As a political matter, it is a problem
on which, despite 20 years of effort, the parties have been unable to arrive at an agreement. That inabil-
ity apparently has been attributable to U.S. apprehensions that the costs of any coordinated solution to
the problem would fall disproportionately on it.
I first estimate the optimized costs to each country of achieving specific environmental objectives
using decentralized but domestic markets for licenses to pollute. I then compare the costs under these
autarkic policies with the costs of a decentralized joint program of abatement, showing that, because of
substantial bilateral spillover benefits to both the U.S. and Canada from the abatement of emissions in
the other country, there are sizeable gains -- on the order of 70 percent annually over a 30-year period -
- to be achieved from simply internationalizing and integrating those markets. One striking insight that
emerges from these estimates is that the conventional beliefs that apparently have forestalled a U.S.-
Canadian agreement are unfounded. When properly optimized, the U.S. has more to gain than to lose
from a coordinated but decentralized program of acid rain abatement.
A second, equally striking finding is that the spillover benefits, while sizeable for both the U.S.
and Canada when compared to autarkic programs of abatement, would be far more substantial for Can-
ada. They are in fact so disproportionate as to render it tempting for Canada to refrain from reaching
agreement and simply to "free ride" of U.S. abatement efforts. These findings suggest, then, that there
might be serious obstacles to negotiating the gains to be achieved from trade. Indeed, in the face of
potential incentives for Canada to "hold out," my findings suggest that it might actually be in the United
States' interest simply to shoulder the cost of Canadian participation in a cost-minimized joint program
of abatement.
The balance of the paper is divided into six sections. Section II provides background on the acid
rain problem in the United States and Canada. Section III describes the methodology that I use in sim-
ulating a marketable permit system to abate sulfur dioxide emissions, including a brief discussion of the
role of "transfer matrices" in specifying the crucial source-receptor mappings. Sections IV and V des-
cribe the data that I used in fashioning the simulations, and the methodology used to fit abatement cost
functions for each point-source emitter in my sample. Section VI sets out the results of the simulations,
and compares the estimated abatement costs facing each country under autarky and an internationally
tradeable permit system. Section VII discusses methods used to test the sensitivity of the results presented
in Section VI. A concluding section summarizes the findings of the simulations and discusses some pol-
icy implications of the findings.
II. Background and Motivation
The primary components of acid rain are sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides, denoted (respectively)
SO, and NO,. When SO, and NO, are released into the atmosphere from either natural or anthropogenic
sources, they can settle as either dry or wet ("acid rain") deposition. In solution, SO, and NO, are
responsible for the acidification of lakes and the resulting death of fish, the destruction of crops, and the
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degradation of man-made structures. Wet deposition has become especially serious in the Northeastern
regions of the United States and in Eastern Canada. Eight "sensitive receptor" regions have been ident-
ified in the eastern regions of both countries, four in each country.3
Programs for the mitigation of acid rain have focused primarily on the reduction of sulfur dioxide
emissions. Anthropogenic sources of sulfur dioxide vary greatly between Canada and the United States.
Since the 1960s, the bulk of U.S. emissions has been generated by coal-fired electric generating plants.'
Because Canada relies more heavily on other sources (such as hydro-electricity) for power, Canadian sul-
fur dioxide emissions come primarily from industrial and manufacturing sources, in particular from non-
ferrous smelters. During 1985, electric power generation accounted for approximately 69 percent of total
U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions, but only 20 percent of Canadian emissions. In contrast, industrial and
manufacturing processes accounted for 67 percent of Canadian emissions and for less than 13 percent of
U.S. emissions. In the aggregate, Canadian emissions were less than 20 percent of U.S. emissions.
These national differences in the sources of sulfur dioxide emissions will prove to be important, because
they lead to differences in the two countries' overall cost structures for the abatement of sulfurous oxide
emissions. See Tables I and 11, below.
(Tables I and II somewhere near here)
One major difficulty in controlling acidic deposition stems from the complex nature of the
"source-receptor" relationship between the emitters of precursors to acid rain and the resulting acidic pre-
cipitation. Evidence for the bilateral nature of these flows has been developed from studies using "long-
range transportation" (or "LRT") modelling of the migratory patterns of acid rain precursors and the res-
3 A "sensitive receptor" region is simply a region that, for ecological reasons, has been identified
as particularly sensitive to damage from acid rain.
* Before that time, the largest source of sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States was
industrial/manufacturing processes (including non-ferrous smelters).
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ulting "source-receptor" relationships.' Although these models have not been perfected, and the choice
of methodology to some extent remains controversial, LRT modelling has afforded policy makers improv-
ed insights into the importance of both inter-state (or inter-provincial) and transnational spillovers of
pollution in achieving domestic ambient pollution objectives.
To date, North American acid rain abatement programs have not come to grips with either the
transboundary nature of the problem or the differences in composition of sources of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions in Canada and the United States. Efforts by the two countries to reach a joint agreement on the
mitigation of acid rain have extended over nearly twenty years, but have been uniformly unsuccessful.
With the Reagan Administration, whatever limited progress had been achieved to that point apparently
came to a halt.' Political considerations aside, two technical considerations have hindered progress
towards any joint U.S.-Canadian agreement: gaps in the scientific understanding of acid rain, and a lack
of actual data on sources of sulfur dioxide emissions. Perhaps more importantly, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the reluctance of the United States to reach a joint agreement has been fueled by the simultan-
' In general, there are two classes of LRT models currently in use. The first is based on a
"Eulerian" grid, that models air masses moving over a fixed grid of points. The second is based on a
"Lagrangian" method, which traces out the trajectory of moving air masses. Each type of LRT model
takes into account such factors as the elevation (usually denoted "stack height") of emissions sources, the
surface contours of the terrain, temperature, and general weather patterns that prevail in the areas of
interest. Each also takes into consideration rates at which chemical reactions occur in the atmosphere in
predicting where the dry or wet deposition will occur.
6 In a 1982 memorandum, Mr. Raymond Robinson, then Executive Chairman of Canada's Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Office, wrote regarding the U.S. stand on acid rain research and
policy development that:
... A pattern of external interference or inadequate support of the work has continued over the
past year and a half. Our scientific experts have attended scheduled meetings and had virtually
no one turn up on the United States' side or had people arrive whom they had never before seen.
Despite the frustration of operating under such conditions, our people have occasionally
succeeded in laboriously putting together a draft only to have it greatly changed by United States
officials who had not been involved in the discussions that produced it.. .
Robinson, R.M., The Rule of Law Between Nations - An Acid Test, presented at the Seventh Symposium
on Statistics and the Environment, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., October 4-5. 1982.
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eous apprehension that the abatement costs would be enormous, and that they would produce no signifi-
cant improvement in environmental quality, despite the fact there has been no concrete evidence to sug-
gest that either supposition is so. With recent improvements in scientific understanding of the problem,
and the recent availability of appropriate data, we are now in a position to begin investigating the extent
to which such apprehensions are founded in fact or in fear.
Ill. A System of Tradeable "Licenses to Pollute"
The system of tradeable "licenses to pollute" that I use in this study draws heavily on theoretical
work by Montgomery (1972). The distinguishing feature of a system of permits of this form is that it
confers on the holder of permits the right to pollute, but only as long as doing so does not lead to an in-
crease in ambient concentrations of the externality of interest above some exogenously specified level,
in any receptor region specified by the administering authority as being of concern.' Such a system
allows the administrator not merely to prescribe the levels of emissions to be permitted, but also, condi-
tional on availability of the requisite data, to fix those levels in a manner calculated to achieve a pre-
specified improvement in ambient environmental quality in one or more regions, taking into account the
natural migratory patterns of the pollutant.
Consider, then, a region in which there are n point-source emitters of sulfur dioxide, indexed by
I ( = 1,..., n). Total annual emissions of sulfur dioxide from point source i is denoted by e1, and the
vector of emissions from all point sources is given by E = (e, ... , e.)'. There are m sensitive receptor
areas in the region, indexed byJ ( = 1, ... , m). Exogenously determined ambient air quality standards
Emissions licenses allow the holder to produce a specific level of emissions, irrespective of the
actual impact of those emissions on ambient environmental quality. Such permits produce efficient
outcomes only if there is a one-to-one relationship between emissions and ambient pollution, a situation
unlikely to arise when multiple jurisdictions are involved, In contrast, a system of "licenses to pollute"
requires each emitter to hold a portfolio of licenses, relating its activities to ambient environmental quality
in each target region.
for sulfur dioxide for each of the m sensitive receptor areas are given by S' = (s,, ..., s.'), which I shall
take to be measured in micrograms/cubic meter/year (pg/m
3/year). Average concentrations of sulfur diox-
ide in receptor regionj are related to emissions at point source i by a "source-receptor" coefficient, h,.
The array of source-receptor coefficients is thus an m x n matrix H with non-negative entries each of
which relates the contribution of one unit of sulfur dioxide emission from point source i to the average
sulfur dioxide concentration in receptor region J:
(1) H= = h..
Given a vector of emissions (E), ambient pollution in the vector of receptor regions is given by S = HE.
The program objective is to construct a policy such that an emissions vector will be chosen that
will bring air quality standards into compliance in each of the m receptor regions, at least total cost for
the entire geographic system. The emissions vector, E, that achieves these objectives will then be effic-
ientfor the given ambient air quality standards, S".* The standards imposed by S' imply that, if all sens-
itive receptor areas are in compliance with the prescribed environmental standards, then HE ; S'.
The level of emissions from each point source is bounded above by a maximum that (at each level
. of output) assumes that no abatement technology were to be adopted (the "base" level of emissions,
denoted e;); and is bounded below by the maximum reduction that could be achieved, using the most
efficient available abatement technology, expressed as a percentage of the base level:
* I emphasize that I am not attempting to simulate cost-minimized implementation of an optimal
program of abatement, which would entail equating the marginal costs of abatement to the marginal
damage from ambient pollution. I instead take the program objective (captured by S') as exogenously
determined and seek optimal implementation of that objective.
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(4) ( - e i s C1,
where i, is the maximum feasible percentage reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions using the best available
control technology.
Associated with each point source is a cost function, denoted C, a minimum value function that
gives the least total cost of achieving emissions e1 with output level y,:
9
(2) C, = C,(e,, y ,).
Each cost function is assumed to be convex and twice differentiable in each of its arguments.
In general, the actual cost to each point source of attaining emissions level e, (given a price, p,,
for its output) is the difference between the profits it would realize by choosing both an output and emis-
sions level (e;*, y;*) to maximize profits, and the profits realized by choosing a profit-maximizing level
of output (f9) given the emissions level e,, or:
With a modest set of assumptions, the solution vector of emissions E* may be attained through
a system of marketable licenses to pollute, using a competitive market for the licenses, from any initial
allocation of those licenses. The assumptions, and proofs of the existence and efficiency of the market,
can be found in Montgomery (1972). Given the existence of a decentralized solution E', one can calcul-
ate the aggregate (optimal) cost of the program by solving the minimization problem (5). Solving that
problem obviously requires both an inventory of sources of emissions and an estimate of each inventoried
source's contribution to ambient concentrations of pollution in each receptor region (the entries in the
matrix H). It also requires information about the cost of abatement at each point source.
IV. Data: The 1985 National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program
Emissions Source Data. Much of the data was derived from sources compiled by the EPA as part
of the 1985 National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Version 2 ("NAPAP"). A series of studies
under this program led to the compilation of over 93 data tapes that contain detailed information on every
emitter of more than 100 tons of any criterion pollutant, located in either the United States or Canada,
as of 1985. (The compiled data started to become available in 1991.)
North American sources of sulphurous oxides in the NAPAP inventories, by country and major
category, are reported in Table I. More generally those sources can be divided into "area" sources and
"point" (or "stationary") sources. The former include locations like bridges and tunnels that concentrate
emissions from atomistic transient sources, while the latter (as the name implies) consist of fixed installa-
tions. While not broken down in Table 1, point sources accounted for approximately 92 percent of all
U.S. and 90 percent of all Canadian sulfur dioxide emissions in 1985. Because point sources account
for the bulk of North American sulfur dioxide emissions, area sources were excluded from this study.
U.S. point sources were further restricted to electric utility generating plants, which by them-
selves accounted for 69 percent of all U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions in 1985 (as can be seen from Table
(3) F 1(e;) = I[p~y; - C;(e; ,y; )l - [pjy1 - C1(e,9;)l.
(As discussed in Section V-B, in estimating abatement costs I actually use a more restricted formulation
in which output is constrained to remain fixed at 1985 levels.)
The least-cost strategy is then given by the solution to:
(5a)
(5b)
min( .. F (e,)
Subject to H -E S,, , and
s e s e ,
(z = 1,. , n).
This represenation may also be extended for the multiproduct firm.
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I). Detailed data on this subset of U.S. point sources was obtained from a NAPAP study denoted the
1985 National Utility Reference File ("NURF"). NURF contains information on electric utility gener-
ating plants that had never been previously available. It includes detailed, unit-level data for 10,778 elec-
tric generating units in the United States (of which 9,755 were existing units, and 1,023 had been
announced at the time of the study)."
In contrast, Canadian sulfur dioxide emissions are not dominated by electric utility plants. As
reported in Table I, electric utility generating plants account for only 20 percent of all Canadian sulfur
dioxide emissions, while industrial and manufacturing processes (in particular, non-ferrous smelters)
account for about 67 percent. Consequently, Canadian point source data used in this study were not
further restricted by source. Data on the point sources actually used were obtained primarily from the
1985 NAPAP Annual Canadian Point Source Inventory ("ACPSI").
The actual sub-sample of the source data used in the simulations consists of a total of 400 point
source emitters of sulfurous oxides. It includes the 200 largest utility generating point source emitters
in the United States; and the 200 largest general point sources in Canada. This sub-sample accounts for
65 percent of all sulfur dioxide emissions from U.S. electric utility generating plants, and over 45 percent
of all U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions; it accounts for over 95 percent of Canadian emissions. Thus, des-
pite the relatively small sample size, it accounts, in the aggregate, for over 53 percent of all 1985 U.S.-
Canadian point source emissions of sulfur dioxide.
Source-Receptor Data. To create the matrix H, source-receptor transfer coefficients were obtain-
ed from a study conducted by the Canada - United States Atmospheric Modelling Work Group 2 ("Group
2'), for the Canada - United States Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution. Several LRT
models were developed by Group 2 to study the impact of sulfur dioxide emissions in both the United
States and Canada on eight regions in the eastern halves of the two countries, four each in Canada and
'" A more detailed description of the NURF files is available from the author upon request.
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the United States." Although different models generally did not yield identical transfer coefficients
for each of those regions, the relative magnitudes of importance of the different contributing states and
provinces proved to be fairly stable across models. In this study, I use the transfer coefficients developed
by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment to simulate long-term ambient concentration and wet deposi-
tion patterns on a regional scale for eastern North America. Those coefficients, arrayed in Table III,
relate the concentration of sulfur dioxide in wet deposition (micrograms per meter cubed per year) from
a one teragram (1012 grams) emission of sulfur dioxide from a source in a given emitting region. So, for
example, one teragram of sulfur dioxide emitted from Ohio would lead to an annual average increase in
wet sulfur dioxide deposition in Region I by 0.22 micrograms per cubic meter, 0.51 micrograms per
cubic meter in Region II, and so on. The source-receptor coefficients indicate that there are potentially
significant transboundary flows of acid rain between the two countries in both directions -- which, if they
can be exploited, may play an important role in a joint program for acid rain abatement.
(Table III somewhere near here)
V. Estimating Control Costs
In general, the term "point source," as used in the files from which the data for this study were
derived, denotes a single boiler unit or smoke stack. In contrast, a "facility" -- a utility, industrial, or
residential installation as a whole -- may often consist of more than a single point source. It seems to
be agreed on within the engineering community that it is more efficient, in terms of both cost and pro-
cess, to adopt abatement technologies point source by point source, at least as long as each point source
is reasonably large, rather than routing all emissions from all point sources in a given installation through
a centralized pollution abatement facility. This is especially true of pre-existing sources of emissions,
to which pollution abatement equipment must be retrofitted.
" The eight regions are Algoma, Muskoka, Quebec, Southern Nova Scotia, Vermont/New Hamp-
shire, the Adirondacks, Pennsylvania, and the Smokie Mountains.
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I therefore estimated cost functions separately for each point source. The cost functions actually
estimated for each point source i relate the aggregate annual cost of abatement to the percentage reduction
in sulfur dioxide emissions (1r) from the "base level" (e,), defined (as above) as the level of emissions
in the absence of any abatement technology. To estimate cost functions for the reduction of sulfur
dioxide emissions, the emissions source data were separated into one of three categories: (1) utility-owned
electric generating plants, (2) non-ferrous smelters, and (3) other industrial or manufacturing processes.
Different abatement technologies were assumed to be adopted within each category. In each case the
choice of technology and determination of costs drew on engineering estimates and methodology, and
included the costs of installing the basic control equipment (e.g., a "scrubber," together with auxiliary
equipment such as fans, hoods, and ductwork), annualized over the equipment's operating life; operating
and supervisory labor costs; maintenance costs; and raw material inputs and electricity. "Retrofit
factors," which scale up basic installation costs for the additional expense of outfitting pre-existing
sources, were used in appropriate cases. In many instances there is a range of feasible technologies by
which to achieve a given level of abatement, so that assumptions were required about the technology
actually adopted at each category of point source. The justification for the assumptions actually adopted
are described in detail in Appendix B and summarized briefly below.
A. Technological Assumptions
1. Electric Utility Generating Facilities
From among thefeasible processes or technologies by which to reduce sulfur diox-
ide emissions from coal-fired electric facilities, I assumed the adoption of one of two general types of
"tlue gas desulfurization" ("FGD") -- or "scrubber" -- systems,
2 which remove sulfur dioxide from
12 In particular, I assumed that abatement was not achieved either by switching to low-sulfur coal,
or by resorting to chemically cleaning high sulfur coal in advance of combustion.
-13-
waste gas streams. So-called "dry" scrubbers are generally installed in facilities with design capacities
of under 100MW and that characteristically use low sulfur coal. Since, however, the sample of source
data actually used in the simulations includes only the largest emitters -- which tend to use high sulfur
coal -- I assumed that "wet" scrubbers would instead be installed. In terms of scrubber operation, I
assumed that the least expensive substance, limestone -- the more expensive alternative is lime -- would
be used as the primary reagent.
2. Non-Ferrous Smelters
For purposes of abating sulfur dioxide emissions, non-ferrous smelters are gener-
ally classified into those having gas streams with more than a 5 percent acid concentration ("strong" gas
streams), and those with "weak" gas streams. For the former, the cheapest means of abating sulfur diox-
ide emissions is through the construction of an on-site plant that concentrates the waste gas stream into
sulfuric acid, and for such smelters I assumed that method of abatement was used. That option generally
is not available for smelters with weak gas streams, unless they were first to install equipment to strength-
en the acid concentration in their waste gases. For them, abatement costs were estimated on the assump-
tion that they installed wet scrubbers.
Available information" was used to match the NAPAP point source data on non-ferrous smelters
with their company name to identify any equipment currently in use. For smelters that already had sul-
furic acid plants in operation as of 1981, I assumed that the same technology would continue to be used.
For smelters with no abatement technology, acid concentrations typical for the type of process in place
were used to determine whether or not the installation of an acid plant would be feasible. That informa-
tion was then used to guide the choice of abatement technology and to estimate pollution abatement costs.
" Data were obtained from the Canadian Mining Handbook (1985), and the Canada - United States
Memorandum of Intent on Air Pollution, Emissions Costs and Engineering Assessment Interim Report,
Work Group 3B (1981).
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3. Other Industrial/Manufacturing Processes
In contrast with utilities and (to some extent) non-ferrous smelters, there is little
general information available on the costs of pollution abatement technology for industrial sources. I
therefore relied heavily on engineering cost estimates and the methodologies outlined in Vatavuk (1990).
One principal difficulty when dealing with sulfur dioxide abatement costs in manufacturing and industrial
installations is allocating costs among pollutants when several are removed using a single abatement tech-
nology. From the range of possibilities, wet scrubbers of either a "venturi" or "double venturi" sort (see
Appendix B), which are suitable for removing both particulates and gaseous emissions, but are somewhat
less efficient at gaseous removal than other scrubbers, were generally used. The choice between the two
types was (following engineering considerations) guided by the maximum flow rate of the emitter's exit
gas. I also chose to allocate all costs of installing and operating the equipment to sulfur dioxide removal,
even though the technology assumed is suitable for the removal of other pollutants as well. Clearly, that
assumption will imposes an upward bias on the resulting estimate of the cost of sulfur dioxide alone. For
each choice of technology, data from Vatavuk (1990) were used in determining equipment costs.
B. Estimating the Cost Functions
Once the choice of abatement technology had been fixed for each point source, I fitted
a linear function to relate that point source's total annualized costs of abatement to its percentage
reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions. In general, the cost of abatement is not linear in abatement: kinks
may exist beyond a particular level of abatement, particularly when a technology is pushed beyond its
maximum reliable level of abatement. Because, however, the simulations restrict the levels of abatement
to be no greater than the maximum reliable efficiency level for each technology's design, it is reasonable
to linearize the cost of abatement function in this area.
Estimates (generally based on information from engineering sources) were developed of the costs
of installing and operating abatement equipment. These estimates include the capital outlay to install the
abatement system (including any auxiliary equipment); fixed operating and maintenance costs (i.e. those
incurred at any positive level of abatement, once the equipment is installed) (FOMC); and operating and
maintenance costs that varied with the level of abatement (VOMC). To annualize the capital cost of the
abatement system, I used a capital recovery factor (CRF) of the form:
= k(1 + k)"
(1 + k)" - 1
(6)
where k is the (allowed) rate of return and m is the lifespan of the project in years." The proper value
for m is typically taken to be the lesser of(l) the estimated remaining operating life of the point source,
or (2) the estimated operating life of the abatement system itself."
Total annualized costs (TAC) are therefore given by:
TACT = ACC, + FOMC + VOMC,,
(7)
where ACC is simply the product of the initial capital outlay for the equipment and the appropriate CRF
(as given in (6)).
Operating cost estimates are typically given in the engineering literature for operating an abate-
ment system at its maximum reliable level of efficiency. To estimate the costs of operating each abate-
ment technology at lower levels of efficiency, a number of assumptions (outlined in Appendix B) were
made for each of the different technologies used. In short, however, I assumed that, to operate at a lower
" A capital recovery factor of this form sums to more than I over the life of the equipment, since
it includes the cost of replacement parts. The rate of return was assumed to remain constant at 5 percent
over the period covered by the estimates, but the results were not sensitive to this assumption.
" Note, also, that by annualizing the capital acquisition expenditures, the estimated cost functions
do not capture the actual pattern of outlays to implement the simulated programs of abatement.
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efficiency, smaller amounts of reagents would be used in the case of the wet scrubber technology."' Re-
duced reductions in emissions were more generally assumed to bear a linear relation to variable operating
and maintenance costs" (but not, obviously, to fixed operating costs or to annualized capital costs).
Consequently, I estimated total annualized costs of abatement at levels of abatement below the
maximum reliable level of efficiency (computed by five percent decrements), by adding reduced variable
costs to annualized capital costs and fixed operating and maintenance costs. Each estimated cost function
was then re-written in terms of percentage abatement:
TAC= a,+ PiI, i = 1,...,n,,
(8)
where 11 is percentage abatement of emissions, determined by reference to the maximum reliable operat-
ing efficiency for the technology assumed to be adopted by point source i. By restricting the cost
function to this form, I am assuming a constant marginal cost of abatement. Furthermore, linearizing
the cost functions in this manner allows me to formulate the problem in (5) as a linear programming
problem."' Note that I assume that the operating load at each point source remains constant (at 1985
levels) for the entire period over which the abatement equipment is depreciated. As such, the cost func-
tions give the minimized cost of achieving a specified percentage abatement of emissions at the (1985)
'' This includes variations in other raw material inputs. For contact sulfuric acid plants, the plants
are simply shut down (not producing) for short periods of time.
" For example, if limestone were to account for 20 percent of variable operating and maintenance
costs of a wet scrubber, and if engineering estimates of all variable costs were $1 million for a 90 percent
reduction, the calculated variable costs for an 80 percent reduction were taken to be $0.2 million*(8/9)
+ $0.8 million.
" Note that corner solutions for each source will dominate the solution for the cost minimization
problem due to the linearization of the cost function with constant marginal cost.
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level of output given in the NAPAP inventories. Hence, setting y,* = Y, = y; in (3), the cost functions
actually used in the simulations take the form:''
(3A) Fj = C1(e1,j,) - jij
where y, = 1985 operating load and ei = 1985 base level of emissions. Accordingly, I do not consider
the possibility of reducing emissions by reducing output levels (or by shutting down any point source).
I consider the sensitivity of the results to this assumption in Section VII.
VI. Simulations and Results
I report results for three basic sets of simulations. In the first, I estimate the costs to the United
States and Canada of achieving at least a 15 percent reduction in average annual acid rain concentration
in each of its own four sensitive receptor regions by means of a domestic, "autarkic" program of abate-
ment.' In the second I estimate the savings in abatement costs to each country from the "spillover"
effects, attributable to transboundary flows of pollutants, from the autarkic policy pursued by the other
(as calculated in the initial simulations). This second set assumes a Stackelberg-like behavior in which
each country is assumed to take the other's autarkic program as given and to free ride off the other's
abatement efforts. Finally, I estimate the costs to each of the two countries under a joint tradeable permit
system. Two different calculations were carried out. In the first, I estimate the total cost of achieving
at least a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentration in all eight sensitive receptor regions. In the
'9 Note that (8) is given in terms of percentage abatement whereas (3A) is in terms of emissions
level. To transform (3A) into (8), 1 use the relationship that:
e, - e
IE, = E
m The choice of a 15 percent across-the-board reduction in acid rain concentrations as an objective
was necessarily arbitrary. Lacking an explicit damage function with which to value reductions in acid
rain, the abatement level cannot be optimally selected.
-18-
second I estimate the total cost of achieving the largest reduction in acid rain concentration, in each of
the eight sensitive-receptor regions, that was achieved under either country's initial autarkic program.
Each simulation consists of the solution to a linear version of the constrained cost minimization
problem in (4) and outlined in Section III. All were solved using linear programming.
2' One prelimin-
ary calculation was carried out before running any of the simulations. Using the 200 largest (electric
utility) point source emitters in the United States and the 200 largest emitters in Canada (as given by the
1985 NAPAP data), I calculated the concentrations of acid rain attributable to those point sources in each
of the eight sensitive receptor regions based on 1985 levels of emission. To do this, I utilized the source-
receptor coefficients summarized in Table III. I applied the appropriate coefficient to each point source,
multiplied it by that point source's actual 1985 emissions, and then summed over all point sources for
each receptor region. In effect I compute HE using the matrix H (expression (1)) and the vector of 1985
base level emissions (9). This yields the average annual acid rain concentration, attributable to all point
sources in the sample, in each receptor region under study. [[(See Table A.I in Appendix A.)]]
The key results for all simulations are summarized in Table IV. More detail on each set of simul-
ations, including shadow values on the program constraints, can be found in separate tables for each
simulation included in Appendix A.
(Table IV somewhere near here.)
A. Autarkic Simulations
In estimating the cost of the autarkic programs of abatement, I assume in each case that:
(1) the program objective is to reduce average acid rain concentrations in each of the
four sensitive receptor regions in the implementing country by at least 15 percent
from 1985 levels, and
2' A simplex algorithm furnished by MATLABTM was used in carrying out all the simulations.
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(2) each country, in formulating its program, takes the other country's emissions as
fixed at 1985 levels.'
Thus, each country is concerned exclusively with its own environmental quality, and cannot rely on spill-
over benefits, due to transboundary flows of pollutants, from abatement efforts by the other. The results
are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table IV.
Under an autarkic program of marketable licenses to pollute, the total annualized cost to the Unit-
ed States of achieving a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentrations in Regions V - VIII is $0.977
billion, an average cost per ton reduction in sulfur dioxide of approximately $381." In the solution to
the program, Regions V and VIII achieve the minimum reduction in acid rain concentration of 15 percent
from base 1985 levels. Region VI achieves a reduction of nearly 25 percent, and Region VII of more
than 45 percent. The annual cost to Canada of an autarkic policy is $1.186 billion, or an average cost
per ton reduction of sulfur dioxide of approximately $1091." The resulting concentration in Region
I reflects the minimum 15 percent reduction; whereas for Regions II - IV, final concentrations are reduc-
ed by between 20 and 40 percent over base 1985 emissions levels.
The autarky results by themselves exhibit some intriguing features. The annual cost to the United
States of an autarkic policy is almost $200 million, or 20 percent, lower than the annual cost to Canada.
In part, this can be explained by the volume of U.S.-generated emissions polluting Canadian receptor reg-
ions, beyond the control of the Canadian authorities. To meet its autarkic objectives, it appears that Can-
ada must reduce domestic emissions by significantly more than would otherwise be necessary if foreign
pollution did not contribute to Canadian acid rain.
2 The four sensitive receptor regions in Canada are regions l-IV; those in the United States are
regions V-VIII.
* Under the U.S. autarky policy, this corresponds to a 2,566,000 ton reduction in sulfur dioxide
emissions.
24 Under the Canadian autarky policy, this corresponds to a 1,085,800 ton reduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions.
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Also striking are the substantial spillovers from both autarkic policies. The U.S. autarkic prog-
ram produces a spillover reduction in acid rain concentration of more than 15 percent in all but one (Reg-
ion III) of the Canadian sensitive receptor regions. The Canadian autarkic policy leads to significantly
more than a 15 percent reduction in two of the U.S. sensitive receptor regions -- Region V and VI -- but
has negligible effects in the others.
B. Estimating Spillover Effects
I next measure the cost savings from these spillover effects by estimating the "free-rider
savings," by which I mean the costs countryj would incur to implement an autarkic policy, knowing that
country I will also implement an autarkic policy (with a 15 percent reduction), and knowing also how
country i's policy will affect country j's acid rain concentrations. Under this "Stackelberg"-type simula-
tion, countryj is "free-riding" off of the reductions in acid rain that occur from country i's program of
abatement, and can therefore reduce its own abatement effort, while still achieving an aggregate reduction
of at least 15 percent in acid rain concentration in each of its own sensitive-receptor regions.
The results for the two "free-rider" estimates are summarized in Table IV, columns 3 and 4.
When the U.S. assumes that Canada will implement a 15 percent reduction in each if the Canadian reg-
ions, the U.S. need only reduce acid rain concentrations in U.S. Regions VII and VIII to obtain a 15 per-
cent reduction (from 1985 levels) in all four of its receptor regions. The annualized costs to the U.S.
under this simulation decline to approximately $231 million, a savings of more than $700 million over
the U.S. autarkic program. The average cost per ton reduction of sulfur dioxide falls to $288, or by
nearly $100 per ton. When the situation is reversed -- that is, when Canada assumes that the U.S. will
implement its own autarkic policy, and free-rides off the U.S. spillover reductions -- the annualized costs
facing Canada drop to $1.8 million, or an average cost per ton reduction of sulfur dioxide of only $23,
with aggregate annualized savings of over $1.0 billion. These findings suggest that there may exist pow-
erful incentives for each country to free-ride off the other, creating possibly substantial hold-up obstacles
to the achievement of a joint U.S.-Canadian agreement on acid rain reduction.
C. Joint Programs of Abatement
Here, I present estimates of the costs of abatement facing the United States and Canada
under two differentjoint programs of abatement, each involving a system of internationally tradeable per-
mits. The objective of the first program is at least a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentration in
each of the eight North American sensitive receptor regions. That is, I re-estimate the cost of abatement,
carried out jointly, holding the original program objective constant. But each of the separate autarky pro-
grams actually achieved substantially greater reductions in one or more of those regions. So it is also
useful to compare the joint costs of achieving the reductions in acid rain concentration actually realized
under the autarkic programs. Hence, I also estimate the cost of a joint program to achieve a reduction
in acid rain concentration in each region at least equal to the maximum reduction for that region achieved
under either the Canadian or U.S. autarky programs. In both instances the savings are dramatic.
Table IV, column 5, reports the costs of the first of these programs. The aggregate annualized
cost of a joint program to achieve at least a 15 percent reduction in each region is estimated to be only
$632 million, of which about $608 million is incurred by the United States (average cost of reduction per
ton sulfur dioxide of $408) and $25 million by Canada (average cost of reduction per ton of sulfur diox-
ide of $50). Aggregate savings over the two autarkic policies are more than $1.5 billion annually, of
which $389 million are enjoyed by the United States and about $1.157 billion by Canada. Joint action
spares both countries the unnecessary effort they would otherwise have had to expend to achieve improve-
ments in domestic environmental quality that were due largely to foreign spillovers of pollutants. By so
doing it reduces the aggregate cost of achieving the original program objectives by more than 70 percent.
Table IV, column 6, summarizes the findings from a joint U.S.-Canada program of abatement
that seeks to achieve acid rain concentrations in each receptor region at least as low as the lowest concen-
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tration under either autarkic program. The aggregate annualized cost of this program is only $1.145 bil-
lion, $1.09 billion incurred by the United States (average cost per ton of reduction of sulfur dioxide is
$311) and $55 million by Canada (average cost per ton of reduction of sulfur dioxide is $91). Canada
achieves larger reductions in acid rain concentration in each of its sensitive receptor region despite a
$1.13 billion reduction in annual cost. The United States experiences substantial gains in reducing acid
rain concentration in all but one of its regions. The price of these gains is modest, not (as commonly
supposed) substantial: a $100 million increase in annualized cost. Overall, the two countries can jointly
produce results at least as good as those actually achieved under the autarkic programs, at about 50 per-
cent of the aggregate cost.
The comparison of either joint program with the costs of the autarkic programs makes a compel-
ling case for coordinated abatement policies. The comparisons implied by all three sets of estimates are
summarized in matrix form in Figure 1. Aggregate combined costs of achieving a 15 percent over-all
reduction of acid rain concentration is clearly minimized by joint effort and maximized through separate
autarkic programs. That is not especially surprising. What is striking, however, is the very substantial
difference in annualized savings to the two countries from free-riding off the other country's autarkic pol-
icy, displayed in the off-diagonal elements of Figure 1. Canada's annualized costs become trivial (approx-
imately $2 million) if it acts on the assumption that the U.S. will implement a 15 percent reduction
through an autarkic policy. In this instance, Canada need only be concerned with Region III, the only
Canadian region in which, under a U.S. autarkic policy, a 15 percent reduction does not occur. In terms
of aggregate joint costs, this is the second least costly solution overall.
(Figure I somewhere near here)
For the United States, reliance on a Canadian autarkic policy produces savings of over $600 mil-
lion annually over a U.S. autarkic policy that is implemented on the assumption that Canadian emissions
remain fixed at 1985 levels. The savings are less dramatic than in the Canadian "free-rider" case.
D. Autarkic Control of All Point Sources
Given the existence of both gains from trade and incentives to free-ride off the other
country's autarkic policy, a natural final question is: how much would country i pay countryj to assist
country i in achieving a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentration in country i's sensitive receptor
regions. To estimate the "pay-offs" that might take place, I return to autarkic programs implemented by
each country to achieve a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentration in each of its own receptor reg-
ions. Now, however, I estimate the aggregate costs to each country acting separately, but assuming that
in can implement a tradeable permit system that involves all 400 point sources in the sample, and com-
pare those costs with the costs facing that country under an autarkic policy optimized only over its dom-
estic sources of emissions.
Column 7 of Table IV summarizes the results of achieving a 15 percent reduction in acid rain con-
centration in each U.S. receptor region. The aggregate annualized cost is $454 million, of which $443
million is incurred for abatement at U.S. point sources and $11 million at Canadian sources." The
difference between this figure and the annualized cost to the United States of its domestic autarkic policy
for a 15 percent reduction ($0.977 billion) is $523 million. Column 8 summarizes the results of a com-
parable simulation, this time to achieve a 15 percent reduction in acid rain at each Canadian region. With
all 400 point sources participating, the total annualized cost of the Canadian program is $385 million (of
which about $350 million consists of abatement at U.S. sources), a savings of about $800 million over
the cost to Canada of a pure autarkic program.
26
One possible way of looking at these final simulations is that, in principle (and for a 15 percent
reduction in U.S. domestic acid rain), the United States should be willing to pay up to $523 million
" The average cost per ton reduction of sulfur dioxide in the United States is $315 and in Canada
is $27.
26 The average cost per ton reduction of sulfur dioxide for the United States is $283 and for Canada
is $67.
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(annually) to obtain Canadian participation in abatement; conversely, Canada should be willing to pay
as much $800 million to obtain U.S. participation. But the simulation results exhibit several other feat-
ures that suggest that neither of those outcomes is likely. Looking first at Canada, the results confirm
that, consistent with the fact that much Canadian ambient pollution arises from U.S. sources, Canadian
ambient air quality is most efficiently improved by abating emissions at U.S. point sources. A program
involving Canadian control over all point sources would be more costly than free-riding off U.S. abate-
ment, but it would also bring all four Canadian regions into compliance. On the other hand, simply free-
riding leaves only Canadian Region III out oftcompliance, a shortcoming that Canada could rectify at neg-
ligible cost. Hence, whether Canada would be willing to pay anything for U.S. abatement would turn
on a strategic judgment about the likelihood of U.S. abatement in the absence of any agreement.
For the United States, efficient abatement still involves reducing emissions predominantly at U.S.
point sources. Nevertheless, the United States can reduce its program cost by more than 50 percent by
securing a relatively trivial measure of abatement at Canadian sources. So it would be extremely advant-
ageous to the United States to secure Canadian participation in any joint program of abatement. Short
of -- and less expensively than -- outright cash transfers, the United States might attempt to secure Canad-
ian participation by offering to allocate initially to all Canadian point sources permits sufficient to allow
them to continue emitting at baseline levels. In effect, some U.S. emitters would compensate Canadian
emitters for any abatement they undertook. Such a scheme would pareto-improve the cost of abatement,
since the net cost to Canada would be zero.
That arrangement would not have the property of bringing all Canadian regions into compliance
with the program objective. But an additional annualized expenditure of about $150 million, mostly at
U.S. point sources, would. That is, if the United States could elicit Canadian participation, and if it
undertook a program calling for a 15 percent reduction in all eight receptor regions, the total annualized
cost to the United States -- the cost of the 15 percent reduction joint simulation - would still be only $632
million. It is not obvious whether Canada might successfully insist that the United States specify a 15
percent reduction in all eight regions as part of the price of its participation; or whether, on the other
hand, the United States might be in a position to insist that Canada bear the annualized costs of that re-
specification of the objective. The bargaining position implied by these estimates is both clearly at odds
with conventional wisdom and potentially quite complex.
VII. Sensitivity Tests and Other Considerations
In interpreting the results reported in Section VI, it is important to keep three significant underly-
ing assumptions in mind. The first two are that, over the 30-year period during which the abatement tech-
nology is in place (and the equipment depreciated), (1) output remains fixed at 1985 levels, and (2) indus-
trial processes (including fuel mixes) remain stable. Both assumptions are needed for estimated base-level
emissions to remain constant over the lifespan of the abatement equipment. Third, I have assumed that
firms do not engage in activities that alter the coefficients that relate their emissions to ambient pollution
in each of the sensitive receptor regions.
In general, options available to polluters do include reducing output or even shutting down. Und-
er the permit system that I use in this paper, shut down should occur if the value of output from any point
source is less than the cost of the portfolio of permits that point source is required to hold. If it were,
it would be more profitable simply to sell the permits and discontinue operation. By assuming that output
remains fixed at 1985 levels, I clearly do not allow for that possibility.
27 Imposing this condition does
allow us to side-step the more complex welfare considerations that arise when facilities actually are shut
down in response to a tradeable permit system. For that very reason, moreover, shut down decisions can
27 For electric utilities, this is not necessarily a bad assumption. The demand for electricity will
generally not decline over time, however, due to technology that allows electricity to be transported very
efficiently over long distances, one may want to allow changes of output amongst plants within a region
so long as over-all output remains constant within that region. Regional boundaries, however, would be
determined wholly on the state of transmission technology, and may be somewhat arbitrary.
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(and, in some instances, probably would) be affected not just by purely economic but by political consid-
erations, taking the form (for example) of special exemptions for particular facilities.
Assumption (2) ensures that technological changes do not occur that affect the way in which the
base emissions are calculated. Changes in industrial processes can, of course, affect emissions levels
dramatically, as can sometimes simple alterations in fuel mix. Allowing the base level of emissions to
change over time would complicate the calculations significantly. Since, moreover, I have no way of pre-
dicting what changes in process design or fuel mix might actually occur, I have not allowed for flexibility
in either of these conditions. 2
The third assumption restricts the h, to being constant over time. So, for example, I do not allow
for the possibility of firms moving, or even making relatively simple changes like altering smokestack
heights, that almost surely would produce time-variation in some of the h.. This assumption warrants
caution in any long-run interpretation of the results. Location issues will be important if over time firms
can with relative ease reduce the costs of abatement they face by relocating to a region from which they
will have less of an impact on environmentally sensitive regions.
Beyond these considerations, shortcomings in data and other information about actual abatement
costs limits the number and quality of the sensitivity tests that can usefully be conducted on the results.
The greatest concern lies with the estimates of the cost of abatement functions. Some simple tests that
I did carry out included examining how robust the results were to changes in the rate of return, which
affects the capital recovery factor I used to annualize the capital outlays. The base cost of abatement
functions were estimated using a 5 percent rate of return. No significant changes resulted from the substi-
tution of a 7 percent rate of return. I also calculated upper and lower bounds on the cost estimates, using
the general rule of thumb that engineering cost estimates are accurate to within ± 20 percent. Allowing
2 As discussed earlier, there is anecdotal evidence for the proposition that there may exist local
political obstacles to the relatively simple step of switching from high to low sulfur coal.
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the estimated (constant) marginal cost of abatement to vary by that amount, I re-ran the simulation for
a joint program with the objective of a 15 percent reduction in acid rain concentration in all eight sensi-
tive receptor regions testing eight different combinations of cost functions." The reductions in acid rain
concentrations remained the same as in the reported simulations in each of the seven variations; the only
differences were in the shadow values of some of the constraints. The basic cost savings from moving
from autarky to a joint program remained robust in all variations 30
VIII. Conclusion and Implications
In an important respect, however, the degree of precision with which the costs of abatement have
been estimated is not the decisive consideration. In the final analysis the real objective of a study of this
sort is not to arrive at precise estimates of actual costs. It is, rather, to study the qualitative nature of
the gains to be achieved from using techniques geared to the efficient attainment of environmental object-
ives in a multi-jurisdictional setting. At an intuitive level, what drives the results reported in this paper
is a combination of (1) the complex relationships between emissions and ambient pollution captured in
the source-receptor coefficients, and (2) the differences in U.S. and Canadian cost structures for abate-
ment of sulfur dioxide emissions stemming from differences in the primary sulfur dioxide producers oper-
ating in the two countries. Hence, as long as the relative costs of abatement between U.S. and Canadian
" That is, allowing both U.S. and Canadian marginal costs to take on the values +20%, 0, and -
20% (where zero denotes no change from the marginal cost used in the reported simulations), I reran the
simulation using each possible combination of costs.
* Two other considerations warrant mention. First, electric utilities are regulated in the United
States and may not necessarily cost minimize. The simulations assume that all polluters will behave in
a cost-efficient manner. If this assumption were violated, the reported results will underestimate the costs
of tradeable permit programs. I have also assumed that trades only occur between polluters; I do not
allow for the possibility that interested outsiders (such as the Sierra Club) might choose to participate in
the market for permits. If individuals or organizations were allowed to buy and sell permits, and had
higher valuations for less acidic rain, then the price of the permits could be driven upward and the cost
of abatement would also be expected to rise.
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emitters have been captured with reasonable accuracy by my estimated cost of abatement functions, and
the source-receptor coefficients remain relatively stable to improvements in LRT modelling, the qualita-
tive insights from the estimates presented above should remain robust to strengthening of the data.
Those insights tend strongly to contradict the belief that it would be prohibitive for the United
States to participate in a joint program of acid rain abatement with Canada. To the contrary, my findings
suggest that both the U.S. and Canada would experience substantial reductions in annualized abatement
costs through joint action. The evidence, however, is also consistent with the possibility that the two
countries might thus far have been unable to reach agreement on a joint program of abatement because
of substantial dfferences in the magnitude of the savings that would accrue to each. Given the differences
disclosed by the simulations, both countries -- but especially Canada -- may be confronted with substantial
incentives to "free-ride" off an autarkic program of acid rain pursued by the other. This may create
potential hold-up problems, turning on difficulties in allocating the gains to be realized from trade. All
this suggests that arriving at a joint agreement may prove to be far more complicated than would be sug-
gested by the simple magnitude of the cost savings that are there to be realized. Unfortunately, if what-
ever differences that have forestalled agreement to date are driven by an inability to allocate gains from
trade, and if it should prove politically infeasible for each country simply to free-ride off the other, the
worst-case scenario might he what we ultimately observe. Each country might end up implementing an
autarkic program of abatement, a course that would, at least on the evidence presented here, maximize
the joint costs of achieving target reductions in acid rain concentration in each country's sensitive regions.
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Figure I:
Annualized Costs (in $1990 Billions) For Different Options to
Achieve a Minimum 15 Percent Reduction in Acid Rain Concentration"
Canada
United States
($0.977, $1.185) ($0.977, $0.002)
(Autarky, Autarky) (Autarky, Stackelberg)
($0.231, $1.185) ($0.608, $0.025)
(Stackelberg, Autarky) (Joint Policy)
3 Note that the upper left entry to the pay-off matrix is not an equilibrium, whereas the other three
entries are, in fact, possible equilibrium outcomes.-R2-
Table I Table III
1985 NAPAP Emissions Inventory Version 232
Point and Area Source Emission by Major Category
SO2 Emissions (103 tons/year)
Source
S_____ United States Canada
Electric Utilities 16,055 819
Industrial Combustion 2,679 340
Comm. / Res. / other Combustion 613 69





Estimates of the Incremental Costs of Removing Pollutants From New Sources"
Sulfur Dioxide Source 1980 Dollars per Metric Ton Removed
Electric Utilities: Eastern Coal 265-298
Western Coal 1,167-1,414




Paper 92 - 12,437
Source-Receptor Coefficients for
Annual Sulfur Dioxide Concentration (pg/m3)
per unit emission (Tg.S/yr)
Sensitive Receptor Areas
Source Region RI RII RIII RIV RV RVI RVII RVIII
Michigan 0.70 1.70 0.50 0.57 0.91 1.50 3.30 0.16
Illinois
Indiana 0.34 0.49 0.19 0.22 0.31 0.46 1.30 0.80
Ohio 0.22 0.51 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.78 4.00 0.37
Penn. 0.17 0.46 0.30 0.62 0.63 0.99 9.20 0.16
New York
to Maine 0.10 0.33 0.40 1.90 1.00 1.60 0.62 0.06
Kentucky
Tennessee 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.74 3.20
W. Virg. to
N.C. 0.10 0.22 0.17 0.40 0.33 0.46 1.70 0.26
Florida
to Mo. to 0.68 0.55 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.38 0.62 1.90
Minn.
Ontario 1.00 3.20 1.90 0.91 2.00 2.20 0.96 0.06
Quebec 0.30 0.57 3.00 1.30 4.70 1.10 0.18 0.03
Atlantic
Provinces 0.03 0.07 0.26 1.50 0.26 0.15 0.05 0.01
RI: Algoma; RII: Muskoka; RIII: Quebec; RIV: Southern Nova Scotia; RV: Vermont/New Hampshire; RVI:
Adirondacks; RVII: Pennsylvania; RVIII: Smokies (Southern Appalachians).
'' Source: U. S. Environmental Protection Agency; 1985 National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, Version 2.
" Environmental Protection Agency, "The Incremental Cost Effectiveness of Selected EPA

















Summary of Total Annualized Costs and
Changes in Acid Rain Concentrations from 1985 Base Levels
for All Program Options
Percentage Change in Acid Rain Concentration from 1985 Base levels
Region U.S. Canada U.S. Canada Joint Joint 15% U.S. 15% Can.
Autarky Autarky Free-Rider Free-Rider Action: Action: Reduction Reduction
15% Max (All Point (All Point
Reduction Reduction Sources) Sources)
Region I - 15.44 -15.00 -15.49 - 16.42 - 17.98 -26.81 -10.16 -16.23
Region II - 16.07 -24.20 -23.39 - 17.43 - 15.00 -28.45 -8.89 -15.00
Region III - 10.99 - 39.65 -38.72 - 15.02 - 24.50 -15.00 -22.07 -25.59
Region IV - 24.24 - 20.37 -22.52 - 26.30 - 17.74 -43.29 -20.98 -16.52
Region V - 15.00 - 37.07 -40.32 - 16.32 - 27.91 -46.21 -26.18 -27.49
Region VI - 24.20 - 20.20 -25.11 -22.64 - 16.52 -40.37 -15.00 -15.61
Region VII - 45.42 - 2.66 -15.00 - 44.64 - 15.00 -62.44 -15.00 -10.07
Region VIII - 15.00 - 0.40 -15.00 - 18.35 - 15.00 -16.22 -15.00 -9.41
Total Cost:








1985 Acid Rain Concentrations Derived from Sample Data
Total Canadian Total U.S. Concentration
Sensitive Receptor Region Contribution (%) Contribution (%) ( g/m3 year)
RI: Algoma 30.88 69.12 0.4165
Rul: Muskoka 51,20 48.80 0.7613
Rill: Quebec 70.06 29.94 0.5452
RIV: Southern Nova Scotia 43.29 56.71 0.4734
RV: Vermont/New H-ampshire 58.97 41.03 0.7818
RVI: Adirondacks 37.15 62.85 0.7673
RVII: Pennsylvania 4.74 95.26 2.0817
RVI1I: Smokie Mountains 0.42 99.58 0.9458
Table All
U.S. Autarky Policy for a 15% Reduction
of Acid Rain Concentrations in Regions V-VIII
1985 Base Autarky Final % Change
Region Concentration Limit Concentration from





Region 1 0.41646 0.3521 - 15.44
Region 1I 0.76132 0.6389 - 16.07
Region 111 0.54510 0.4851 - 10.99
Region IV 0.47328 0.3595 - 24.24
Region V 0.78181 0.66450 0.6645 - 15.00
Region VI 0.76740 0.65219 0.5816 -24.20
Region VII 2.08182 1.76946 1.1362 -45.42
Region ViII 0.94559 0.80390 0.8039 - 15.00
Total Cost: $0977 Billion
Table A.II
Canadian Autarky Policy for a 15% Reduction
of Acid Rain Concentrations in Regions I-IV
1985 Base Autarkcy Final % Change
Region Concentrahion Limit Concentration from
( glm'Iyr) (uglm'(yr) (fg(m'(yr) B~ase
Region 1 0.4165 0.3540 0.3540 - 15.00
Region 11 0.7613 0.6471 0.5770 - 24.20
Region III 0.5451 0.4634 0.3289 - 39.65
Region IV 0.4733 0.4024 0.3768 - 20.37
Region V 0.7818 0.4920- 37.07
Region VI 0.7674 0.6123 - 20.20
Region VII 2.0818 2.0263 - 2.66
Region VIII 0.9456 - ______- 0.9416 - - 0.40
Total Cost: $1.185 Billion
Table A.IV
Dual Values of Sensitive Receptor Constraints in $/qscgfm3/yr)
Region Shadow Value From U.S. Shadow Value From Canada Autarky
Autarky Policy Policy




Region V 0.19923 x 10' _____________
Region VI 0__________ _____
Region V11 0 _______________




Table AN Tab A.VTable A.VI
Estimated Value to the United States of the Spillover Effects
From the Canadian Autarky Policy on U.S. Sensitive Receptor Regions V-VIII
Spillover Final









Region V 0.4920 0.4963' 0.7571
Region VI 0.6123 0.3374 0
Region VII 2.0263 0.3006 0
Region VIII 0.9416 0.1016 0
Total Cost: $3.00 Billion
Estimated Value to Canada of the Spillover Effects From The United States
Autarky Policy on Canadian Sensitive Receptor Regions IV
Spillover Final








Region 1 0.3521 0.35 15 0
Region 11 0.6389 0.5709 0
Region 111 0.4851 0.3128 0










Table A.VII Joint U.S. - Canada Policy
For a 15% Reduction in Acid Rain Concentrations








Concentration 15 Percent Concentration 15 Percent
Under Reduction Final Under U.S. Reduction of Final
Canadian of Base Autarkic Base
Autarkic Policy
Policy
RI - - 0.3520 0.3521 0.3540 0.3481
Rif - - 0.5832 0.6389 0.6471 0.6286
Rill - - 0.3341 0.4851 0.4634 0.4633
RIV - - 0.3668 0.3585 0.4024 0.3489
RV 0.4920 0.6645 0.4666 - - 0.6542
RVI 0.6123 0.6522 0.5746 - - 0.5936
RVII 2.0263 1.7695 1.7695 - - 1.1525
RVIII 0.9416 0.8039 0.8039 - - 0.7722
Cost $0.231 Billion $0.002 Billion
Maximum Final % Change Dual







Region 1 0.3540 0.3416 - 17.98 0
Region 11 0.6470 0.6470 - 15.00 9.8052 x 10
Region III 0.4634 0.4061 - 24.50 0
Region IV 0.4023 0.3893 - 17.74 0
Region V 0.6445 0.5636 - 27.91 0
Region VI 0.6522 0.6406 - 16.52 0
Region VII 1.7696 1.7696 - 15.00 0.3826 x l06
Region VIII 0.8039 0.8039 - 15.00 1.3385 x 10a
Total Cost for the U.S.: $0.608 Billion
Total Cost for Canada: $0.025 Billion
-R6- -R7-
Table A.IX
Joint U.S. - Canada Policy
For a Maximum Reduction in Acid Rain Concentrations
in all Eight Sensitive Receptor Regions
as Determined Under the Two Autarkic Policies
Maximum Final % Change Dual
Region Allowable Concentration From Base Values




Region 1 0.3521 0.3048 - 26.81 0
Region Il 0.6389 0.5447 - 28.45 0
Region 111 0.4851 0.3289 - 15.00 3.7574 x 107
Region IV 0.3585 0.2684 - 43.29 0
Region V 0.4920 0.4205 - 46.21 0
Region VI 0.6123 0.4576 - 40.37 0
Region V11 1.1362 0.7819 -62.44 0
Region VIll 0.8039 0.7922 - 16.22 0
Total Cost for the U.S.: $1.090 Billion
Total Cost for Canada: $0.055 Billion
Table A.X
Achieving a 15 Percent Reduction in U.S. Sensitive Receptor Regions
Using all 400 Point Sources
Maximum Final % Change Dual





Region 1 0.3742 -10.16
Region II 0.6936 -8.89
Region 111l0.4248 -22.07
Region IV 0.3740 -20.98
Region V 0.6645 0.5771 -26.18 0
Region VI 0.6522 0.6522 - 15.00 6.6892 x 106
Region VII 1.7695 1.7695 - 15.00 0.1734 x 106
Region VIII 0.8039 0.8039 - 15.00 1.8005 x 10
Total Cost (U.S. sources): $0.443 Billion
Total Cost (Canadian sources): $0.011 Billion
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Table A.XI
Achieving a 15 Percent Reduction in Canadian Sensitive Receptor Regions
Using all 400 Point Sources
Maximum Final % Change Dual
Region Allowable Concentration From Base Values
Concentration (pg/m/yr) ($/ g/m'/yr)
(jg/mlIyr)
Region 1 0.3540 0.3489 - 16.23 0
Region _ _ 0.6471 0.6471 -_15.00 1.3663 x 10
Region Ill 0.4634 0.4056 - 25.59 0
Region IV 0.4024 0.3951 - 16.52 0
Region V 0.5669 -27.49
Region VI 0.6476 - 15.61
Region VII 1.8722 - 10.07
Region VIII 0.8566 - 9.41
Total Cost (U.S. sources): $0.349 Billion
Total Cost (Canada sources): $0.036 Rillion
Appendix B
This section outlines some of the assumptions that were used in order to construct estimates of
the cost functions for each point source used in the simulations presented in the text. Appendix B is
presented in three sections -- one section for each category of point source: (1) utility generating facility,
(2) non-ferrous smelters, and (3) other industrial/manufacturing processes.
B.a Utility Generating Facilities
A number of feasible technologies and processes to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions are available
to electric generating facilities. These include switching from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal:
physically cleaning coal to remove pyritic sulfur; and installing dry or wet scrubbers, which may use
either lime or limestone as a primary reagent, to remove the SO2 from the waste gas stream prior to its
release into the environment. Each of these alternatives has varying capacities for reducing sulfur dioxide
emissions, and each carries its own characteristic costs. Various studies conducted by ICF and the EPA
have shown that the least cost abatement choice would be to switch from high sulfur coal to low sulfur
coal. Anecdotal evidence supports this finding, as indicated by an article appearing in the "Environment"
column of the Wall Street Journal which reported that high sulfur coal producing states were offering tax
incentives to industries that would install scrubber technology to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions in lieu
of switching to low sulfur coal."
Other than the political opposition to coal switching, there are also difficulties due to the long
term contracts that exist between most utility plants and coal mines. In 1985, more than 79 percent of
electric utility plants with larger than 50 MW capacity purchased under 30 percent of their coal on the
3 Rosewicz, Barbara; "Environment;" Wall Street Journal, Tuesday November 12, 1991.
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spot market." All other coal was purchased through long term contracts. Given these circumstances,
I do not consider coal switching to be a viable alternative for electric utility plants.
Coal scrubbing is another possible alternative for electric utility plants. Chemically cleaning coal
can remove up to 20 percent of the pyritic sulfur content of high pyritic content coal. This process
requires that the coal be crushed and a chemical "wash" be applied to the pulverized coal. Unfortunately,
this process is prohibitively expensive for low and medium sulfur coals. The cost per ton of coal cleaned
increases by a factor of more than 900 percent for these categories of coal." Given the limited ability
to remove sulfur from the coals and the costs associated with physically cleaning coal, scrubber
technologies are assumed to be adopted by all electric utility point sources, unaccompanied by any switch
to low-sulfur coal.
There are two general categories of "flue gas desulfurization" (FGD) or scrubber technologies
that are used to remove sulfur dioxide from electric utility waste gas streams -- a dry scrubber system
and a wet scrubber system. Dry scrubber systems are generally installed in small facilities (s 100 MW
design capacity) that use low sulfur coal. Given that the sample data that are used in this paper consist
of only the largest emitters of sulfur dioxide that also tend to use high sulfur coal, I assume that a wet
scrubber system will be installed. Furthermore, I assume that the cheapest reagent, limestone, will be
used.
Several factors can affect the cost of installing and operating a wet scrubber system that uses
limestone. The most important (apart from the sulfur content of the coal being used) are (1) the design
capacity of the scrubber; (2) the scrubber's operating load; (3) the percentage removal rate of the sulfur
dioxide, and (4) the "retrofit factor." The design capacity is simply the maximum capacity (in MW) for
" See 1985 Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility Plants.
* See United States - Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution. Emissions
Costs and Engineering Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 38, February 1981.
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which the scrubber was designed. Scrubber systems are always sized as to be able to process emissions
produced at maximum operating capacity of the unit on which it is installed. Installation costs vary with
design capacity. The load factor (or operating load) describes the percentage of that maximum capacity
that is utilized (on average) during a given year. The load factor will affect the costs of operating and
maintaining the scrubber. The maximum percentage removal of sulfur dioxide varies with the abatement
technology, which in this setting includes not only the kind of device being installed, but also both the
choice and amount of primary reagent employed. For wet scrubbers the maximum reliable removal rate
is 90 percent. A reduction in the amount of limestone will produce a lower removal rate, and will reduce
the costs of operating the system.
Data on the design capacity of each U.S. utility unit is found in the 1985 NURF. Similar data
are not available for Canadian utility point sources, however, throughput values are available for 1985.
In order to estimate the design capacity for the Canadian utility sources, I start by assuming a 60 percent
load factor for 1985. By using the average BTU content for the coal found in the Province in which the
point source is located, and by assuming an 8760 hr/year operating schedule, an estimate for the design
capacity can be found using the following equation:
(B.1)




where throughput is measured in tons of coal.
Retrofit factors are provided for only a select number of units in the 1985 NURF. For point
sources where actual estimated retrofit factors were not available, general "rule of thumb" retrofit factors,
developed by ICF and the EPA, were used. Retrofit factors are used to adjust 100 percent of the capital
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costs and 75 percent of the fixed operating and maintenance costs. Engineering estimates of the
installation and equipment costs of wet scrubber systems were also taken from an ICF report prepared
for the EPA. These estimates are set out in Table B.I. The costs in Table B.I are reported in early 1986
dollars, but are escalated to 1990 dollars using the CPI for the actual simulation experiments.
Annualized costs are calculated in the following manner." The average lifetime of a wet
scrubber system is 50 years. The "correct" time period over which the scrubber system should be
depreciated is the shorter of the remaining lifespan of the plant and the lifetime of the scrubber. When
the data for the remaining lifespan of the plant (as measured from 1992) was available I used this time
period as the relevant period over which to calculate the annualized capital costs. When data were not
available, or if the remaining lifespan data were questionable (e.g. negative years reported as remaining
lifespan measured from 1985), the full lifespan of the scrubber system of 50 years was used. The cost
of capital was assumed to he constant at 5 percent over the relevant time period.
To determine the annualized costs associated with different levels of abatement I use the fact that
one simple way of altering abatement levels is to change the amount of limestone used in the abatement
process. Reductions in the level of abatement are assumed to vary directly with the variable operating
and maintenance costs."
" The capital recovery factor is given by:
CRF - [k(l + k"]
[(1 tk)' - 1]
" This includes the cost of the reagant (limestone), which accounts for approximately 20% of the




Wet Scrubber Costs for New Utility Power Plants
Sulfur Level
Very Very
Low Low Low Medium Medium High Medium High High
Capital Costs
($/kw) 108 110 110 124 133 145 154
Fixed O&M
Costs 4.92 4.98 5.00 5.45 5.74 6.11 6.39
($/kw)
Variable O&M











Size to a New Scrubber
Greater than 400 Mw 110%9
Between 150 - 399 Mw 140%
Less than 150 Mw 200%










Fixed O&M Cost Relative




removal of sulfur dioxide using a Wet
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B.b Non-Ferrous Smelters
Air pollution control for non-ferrous smelters has primarily been focused on the control of sulfur
dioxide emissions. For the purpose of controlling sulfur dioxide emissions, non-ferrous smelters fall into
two general categories: strong gas stream smelters and weak gas stream smelters. Strong gas stream
smelters are generally categorized as smelters with gas streams of greater than 5 percent acid
concentration. Typically for this category of smelter, the cheapest abatement technology for sulfur
dioxide removal is the construction of an on-site metallurgical sulfuric acid plant. The drawbacks of this
technology are related to whether there exists a market for the sulfuric acid from the smelters (which may
be of a higher cost than sulfuric acid from other sources). Neutralization disposal costs of the sulfuric
acid may substantially raise the costs of this technology.
Costs for three different control options on a single contact acid plant for a strong off-gas smelter
are used. The first option assumes a continuous gas stream and requires a minimum of 12 percent gas
concentration, the second is for a variable gas stream which requires between 5 and 8 percent gas
concentration, and the third option is for both a continuous and variable gas stream which requires
between 6 and 12 percent gas concentration.
Smelters with weak off-gas streams (acid concentrations < 5 percent) do not have the option of
using an on-site sulfuric acid plant to control for sulfur dioxide emissions unless they wish to put into
place technology that will strengthen the acid concentration of their exit gas. Another option that is
available to these smelters is a flue gas desulfurization system (FGD) which uses wet scrubber
technologies.
Data from the Canadian Mining Handbook (1985) and the Canada - United States Memorandum
of Intent on Air Pollution. Emissions Costs and Engineering Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 38
(1981) were used to match the NAPAP point source data from the non-ferrous smelters to their company
name in order to identify the process equipment used at the site. For smelters that had sulfuric acid
plants in operation as of 1981, 1 assumed that this technology would continue to be used. For smelters
with no abatement technology in place, typical acid concentration figures from each type of process
equipment was used to determine whether or not an acid plant facility could be used for the particular
point source. If the typical off-gas stream acid concentration was larger than 5 percent, I then determined
which control option for the acid plant could be used. Cost information for each control option is given
in at the end of this Appendix. It is assumed that if an acid contact plant is used, to reduce the efficiency
level from the assumed optimal level, the plant would simply be closed down.
Point sources from non-ferrous smelters that could not be outfitted with an acid plant were
assumed to install a wet scrubber system. Costing for the scrubbers were assumed to be the same as for
other industrial and manufacturing processes and is described briefly below. Costs are annualized using
the same methodology described in Section B.a. Sulfuric acid plants are taken to have a maximum
reliable removal rate of sulfur dioxide of 90 percent. The average lifetime of an acid plant is given to
be 30 years.
B.c Other Industrial/Manufacturing Processes
Unlike utilities and to some extent, non-ferrous smelters, there is very little general information
available on the costs for pollution abatement technology for industrial sources. For this section, I rely
heavily on the engineering cost estimates and methodology outlined in Vatavuk, (1990). One of the
difficulties involved with determining the costs associated with the reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions
in the manufacturing and industrial sectors is in the appropriate allocation of costs between various
pollutants that are removed using the same abatement technology. For example, electric static
precipitators (ESPs) are often used to remove particulates, but can also remove sulfur dioxide from
exhaust gases. For point sources associated with industrial and manufacturing processes, I allocate
abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by accounting for thefull cost of the primary technology associated
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with sulfur dioxide removal, regardless of whether this technology is also responsible for the removal of
other pollutants. Clearly, this will bias the cost of abatement for sulfur dioxide upward.
There are numerous technologies available to remove sulfur dioxide emissions from different
industrial and manufacturing processes. For purposes of this paper, I concentrate only on wet scrubbers,
which in general, can he categorized as particulate scrubbers or gaseous scrubbers. Particulate scrubbers
(e.g. spray towers or venturis) are designed primarily to remove particulate matter from the exhaust
stream, however, are also capable of removing gaseous emissions. Gaseous scrubbers (packed or tray-
type columns) are designed to be more effective at removing gases of low concentrations.
Packaged scrubber systems are priced according to the "maximum gas volumetric flowrate"
(measured in actual cubic feet per minute, ACFM) that the system can accommodate. Equipment costs
include the actual scrubber system along with auxiliary equipment such as pumps, internal piping, and
separators. The costing procedures for equipment (add-on controls and auxiliary equipment), operation,
and maintenance are taken from Vatavuk (1990). Typical gas flow design rates are assumed for each
process design and are given in later in this Appendix. Gas flow rates are usually given in standard cubic
feet per minute (SCFM), which describes the volumetric flow rate at standard temperature and pressure.
Conversion from SCFM units to ACFM units are necessary and was done by assuming typical
temperature and pressure values for each process for each point source.
Each point source was assumed to be retrofitted with either a Venturi or Double Venturi scrubber
system. The choice between the two technologies was determined by the estimated maximum volumetric
tlow rate of the waste gas stream measured in ACFM. Those with estimated ACFM larger than 59,000
ACFM were assumed to install Double Venturi systems. This is a technical assumption, that takes into
account the capacity of the point source. Once the abatement technology was chosen, linear cost
estimates from Vatavuk were used to determine equipment costs. The estimated equipment costs for
Venturi and Double Venturi systems (including auxiliary equipment) is given (in June 1988 dollars) by:
Venturi Scrubber:
P($) = 8180 + 1.41Q
where 600 5 Q, ACFM 5 19,900
or
P($) = 84.2Q0012
where 19,000 5 Q S 59,000.
Price includes venturi, mist eliminator, fan (direct or belt driven), recirculation liquid pump, and sump.
Construction material is carbon steel.
"Double Venturi" Collision Scrubber:
P($) = 492Q*45*
where 2000 < Q, ACFM 120,000.
Price includes Collision Scrubber throat, diffuser, entrainment separator, and all internals. Construction
material is carbon steel.
To calculate the total cost of the scrubber system, I use the "adjustment" factors given in Table
8.II, below:
Table B.II
Total Cost Calculations Used for Venturi and Double Venturi Scrubber Systems'
Total Capital Investment 1.91 times equipment cost




Supervisory 15% of operating labor costs
Maintenance Material 100% of maintenance labor
Electricity, Waste Management, Raw Materials 50% of all labor costs
* Vatavuk (1990)
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The maximum reliable removal rate for Venturi and Double Venturi scrubbers is taken
to be 80 percent. Reductions in abatement efficiency levels are assumed to vary directly with the costs
of electricity, waste management and raw materials. Total costs are annualized using the methodology
described earlier in Section B.a. The average lifetime of a scrubber is 30 years.
Table B.III
Summary of Canadian Copper and Nickel Smelter Statistics
Smelter Location Process Equipment Control % Containment
Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting 13 Multihearth Nil




Inco Limited 5 Fluid Bed Roasters Nil
Thompson, Manitoba 5 Electric Furnaces
7 Converters
Inco Limited 33 Multihearth Liquid SO2 44
Copper Cliff, Ontario roasters Plant,
6 Reverberatory Acid Plant
furnaces
1 Inco Oxygen Flash
19 Converters
Falconbridge 2 Fluid Bed Roasters Acid Plant 56
Nickel Mines, Ltd. 2 Electric Furnaces
Sudbury, Ontario 4 Converters








Afton Mines Ltd. 1 Top Blow Rotary Scrubber 80
Kamloops, B.C Converter
Kidd Creek Mines Ltd., Timmins, Mitsubishi Continuous Acid Plant 95+
Ontario Smelting Process
United States - Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transhoundary Air Pollution. Emissions Costs and Engineering
Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 3B, (Feb. 1981).
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Table B.IV
Summary of Canadian Lead - Zinc Smelter Statistics
Smelter Location Process Equipment Control % Containment
Cominco, Ltd. 2 Sinter Machines Acid Plants 944i
Trail, British Columbia 2 Fluid Bed Roasters
2 Blast Furnaces
Brunswick Mining & Smelting I Sinter Machine Acid Plants 95+
Corporation, Ltd. I Blast Furnace
Belledune, New Brunswick
Kidd Creek Mines, Ltd. 2 Fluid Bed Roasters Acid Plants 95+
Timmins, Ontario
Canadian Electrolytic Zinc, Ltd., 4 Fluid Red Roasters Acid Plants 95+
Valleyfield, Quebec
United States - Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transhoundary Air Pollution. Emissions Costs and Engineering
Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 3B, (Feb. 1991).
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Table B.V
Abatement Costs: Sulfuric Acid Plants (1981 $s)
Control Options SCFM % SO2 Capital Cost Operation Cost
(Single Contact Acid Plant) in Gas Stream (106 $) (106 $)
Continuous Gas Only 27 000 12 17 1.5
Variable Gas Only 49 000 5 - 8 28 2.2
Continuous Gas and
Variable Gas 36 000 6- 12 22 1.8
United States - Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transhoundary Air Pollution. Emissions Costs and Engineering
Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 3B, (Feb. 1981).
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Table B.VI
Canadian Copper - Nickel Smelter SO2 Off-Gas Strength by Emitting Equipment
SO2 Off-Gas Strength %
Metal Emitting Equipment
Min - Max Typical
Copper Multiple Hearth Roaster 1 - 3 less than 2
Fluid Bed Roaster 10 - 14 12
Reverberatory Furnace 0.5 - 2.5 1.5
Electric Furnace 4 - 8 -
Inco Flash Furnace 10 - 14 -
Mitsubishi 3 - Furnace System 10 -
Noranda Furnace 8 - 20 13
Nickel Multi-Hearth Roaster 1 - 3 less than 2
Reverberatory Furnace i - 2 1.5
Fluid Bed Roaster 10 - 14 -
United States - Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution. Emissions Costs and Engineering
Assessment Interim Report, Work Group 3B, (Feb. 1981).
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